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International Law: Blaming Big Brother: Holding States
Accountable for the Devastation of Terrorism
If you harbor terrorists, you are terrorists. If you train or arm a
terrorist, you are a terrorist. If you feed a terrorist or fund a
terrorist, you're a terrorist, and you will be held accountable by
the United States and our friends.
_ President George W. Bush'
L Introduction
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States recognized
a growing concern with holding terrorists accountable for the massive losses
they inflict through indiscriminate violence. President George W. Bush's War
on Terror immediately focused on holding the involved terrorists accountable
for the September 11 attacks.2 While other members of the international
community responded to September 11 within their own domestic justice
systems to punish terrorists, the Bush Administration responded to this
pressing need by creating military tribunals to mete out punishment.3 In
1. John Alan Cohan, Formulation of a State 'sResponse to Terrorism and State-Sponsored
Terrorism, 14 PACE INT'L L. REv. 77, 93 (2002) (quoting Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Says War
May Go Beyond Afghan Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at B2).
2. George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, in America's Ordeal: 'Our Grief Has
Turned to Anger', NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 2001, at A2; see also Tony Blair, Why Saddam Is Still
a Threat to Britain, EXPRESS, Mar. 6,2002, at 12; Joseph Sullivan, Why WarAgainst Terrorism
Is Justified, FIN. GAZETTE, Nov. 1, 2001. According to the U.S. government, al Qaeda and
other extremist Islamic terrorist groups pose the greatest security threat. Combating Terrorism:
Protecting the United States, Parts I and II: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Nat'l
Security, Veterans Affairs and Int'l Relations, Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. 155-56
(2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of James Caruso, Deputy Executive Assistant Director
for Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of Investigation). While the focus on terrorism has
traditionally targeted State sponsors, the role of States in supporting terrorism has slowly
declined. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FUR COMBATING TERRORISM 7 (2003),
available at http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_ terrorism/counter_
terrorism_strategy.pdf [hereinafter NSCT]. As a result, the primary focus of the war on
terrorism has shifted to targeting individual terrorists and their organizations. See id. at 15.
3. See Bill Wallace, Global Hunt for Terrorists a First, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 29, 2001, at
Al.
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addition, the United States launched a military campaign in Afghanistan to
root out al Qaeda, the group deemed responsible for September 11.'
However, despite the world focus on the terrorists themselves, the Bush
Administration's War on Terror developed a secondary goal of holding State
sponsors of terrorism accountable for their assistance.' Foreign States (States)
have long used terror as an element of both domestic and foreign policy, and
since the 1980s governments have even adopted terrorism as a means to carry
out foreign policy without detection.6 Although the role of State sponsors has
actually declined over the past decade, States nonetheless continue to provide
terrorist groups with substantial assistance.7 Consequently, there remains a
significant need to target foreign States as sponsors and supporters of terrorist
groups.8
Historically, without the support of States, terrorist cells lacked the
necessary power and resources to maintain an effective and capable
organization. 9 As Abraham Sofaer, former U.S. State Department advisor, has
stated, "States have the resources to provide [terrorist] groups with the
training, equipment, support, and instructions that enable them to inflict far
greater damage than would be possible by independent agents."' Indeed, the
1980s demonstrated that state-sponsored terrorists achieved destruction eight
times more deadly than attacks perpetrated by independent terrorist groups."
4. Dan Balz, U.S., Britain LaunchAirstrikesAgainst Targets inAfghanistan, WASH. POST,
Oct. 8, 2001, at Al.
5. See John Diamond, Powell Sets Termsfor a New Regime, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 25, 2001, at
6; see also NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OFTHE UNITED STATES
OFAMERICA 12 (2002) [hereinafter NSS], available athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc.nss.pdf;
Jay M. Vogelson, Multinational Approaches to Eradicating International Terrorism, 36 INT'L
LAW. 67, 70 (2002). But see MATTHEW LEvrr, PATTERNS OF TERRORISM 2002: TERROR,
COUNTERTERROR, AND STATE SPONSORSHIP (Wash. Inst. for Near East Policy, Policywatch No.
753,2003), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org [hereinafter LEVITT, PATTERNS OFTERRORiSM].
6. Hearings, supra note 2, at 156-57 (statement of James Caruso, Deputy Executive
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of Investigation); BRUCE HOFFMAN,
INSIDE TERRORISM 185-86 (1998).
7. NSCT, supra note 2, at 6-7.
8. LEVITT, PATTERNS OF TERRORISM, supra note 5; MEGHAN L. O'SuLLIVAN, SHREWD
SANCTIONS: STATECRAFT AND STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM 6 (2003).
9. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International
Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 98 (1989); see also
Michael N. Schmitt, The Sixteenth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law:
Bellum Americanum Revisited: U.S. Security Strategy and the Jus adBellum, 176MILL.REv.
364, 377 (2003).
10. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 98; see HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 186.
11. HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 189; see also JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 31 (1989) [hereinafter MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT]. Terrorists can




However, as September 11 proved, terrorist cells may no longer require
funding and supplies from States to achieve total destruction. In fact, the
September 11 terrorists murdered close to 3,100 people with only box cutters
and four hijacked airplanes.1 2 The al Qaeda network, responsible for more
terrorist attacks in the last five years than any other terrorist group,' 3 has
established both legal and illegal businesses throughout the world to fund its
terrorist activities. 4 Therefore, States may no longer serve as the prominent
source of life for terrorist cells. Nonetheless, as the U.S. National Security
Council noted in its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, although
terrorist organizations have begun to rely more on criminal activity for
funding and support, they still require the sanctuary of States to effectively
operate. 1' As a result, States remain an important focus in responding
effectively to terrorism.
While September 11 confirmed the social need to hold terrorists and their
State sponsors accountable after the fact, the attacks also reminded the United
States and the international community of the additional need to deter future
terrorist activity. 6 However, the international community faces significant
difficulty in punishing individual terrorists and groups because terrorist cells
are unreachable as long as States continue to provide a safe haven for them. 7
And where States actually have the authority and desire to exercise
jurisdiction over individual terrorists, they often have difficulty locating the
suspects.' 8 As a result, the threat of harsh punishment often has little
influence on deterring terrorists. 19
Deterrence also often fails to dissuade terrorist actors because of the
ideological convictions and determination to affect social change that lie at the
12. Emanuel Gross, The Laws of War Waged Between Democratic States and Terrorist
Organizations: Real or Illusive?, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 389, 392 (2003); Paul Overberg, Final
Sept. 11 Death Toll Remains Elusive, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 2002, at Al.
13. Hearings, supra note 2, at 153, 156 (statement of James Caruso, Deputy Executive
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of Investigation); LEvITr, PATTERNS
OF TERRORISM, supra note 5.
14. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2002, at 119 (2003),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20177.pdf [hereinafter PATTERNS OF
GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2002]; see generally Schmitt, supra note 9, at 373, 377.
15. NSCT, supra note 2, at 8; see O'SU.LIVAN, supra note 8, at 6, 322 n.9; Schmitt, supra
note 9, at 377, 379.
16. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 47 (statement of Colonel Randall J. Larsen).
17. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism: American
Hegemony or Impotence?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 37, 39 (2000).
18. Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 289, 298 (1987).
19. Id.
20031
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heart of modern terrorism.2" Indeed, the inherently secret nature of terrorism
serves to protect terrorists from punishment. Consequently, it is necessary to
focus not on deterring the terrorist organizations that actually carry out
attacks, but on holding their State sponsors and supporters accountable.2
Unlike individual terrorists or terrorist cells, States have incentive to desist
from sponsoring or supporting terrorism. Most States recognize that the
international community will avoid strong diplomatic relations with States that
sponsor or support terrorism.2 Accordingly, the need to maintain an
untarnished reputation provides sufficient reason for most States to avoid ties
to terrorism.23 Nonetheless, the diplomatic threat remains insufficient for
other States.24 The international community must therefore effectively
respond to state-sponsored terrorism to achieve any significant results in the
War on Terrorism.
Because States are more visible than individual terrorist groups, the
international community can more easily counteract a terrorist State than a
terrorist cell located within the sovereign territory of a State.2" The
international community and individual States also have a wider range of
options with which to respond to terrorist States than to independent terrorist
organizations.26 Because States are the primary subjects of international law,27
the international legal framework provides numerous means to hold States
accountable for violating international legal standards.28 States may face
20. Id.; see also MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT, supra note 11, at 37; Joe Kendall et al., The
Diligence Due in the Era of Globalized Terrorism, 36 INT'L LAW. 49, 57 (2002). See generally
Louis P. Pojman, The Moral Response to Terrorism and Cosmopolitanism, in TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 135, 138-41 (James P. Sterba ed., 2003). In particular, religious
terrorist groups hold such ideological convictions that they are willing to sacrifice their own
lives for their cause. Such groups include al Qaeda, which claims the need to reestablish a
Muslim State through the entire world and wage religious war on the United States. PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2002, supra note 14, at 118; Cohan, supra note 1, at 98.
21. Abbott, supra note 18, at 298-99.
22. Id. at 299.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Issues of territorial sovereignty arise where States intervene in the exclusive jurisdiction
of another State. IAN BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed.
1990). However, a State may legally violate another State's territorial soveriegnty to employ
the use of force in self-defense. Id. at 377. Where the sovereign State is accountable for
terrorism, the use of force in self-defense may be valid. See infra Part V.C.
26. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT, supra note 11, at 32.
27. BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 59.




diplomatic and economic sanctions, the use of force in self-defense, and
international and domestic lawsuits.2 9
In contrast, terrorists have no political status and occupy no specific
territory.3" As a result, the international community has difficulty imposing
accountability on these groups. Because they lack the attributes of statehood,
terrorist groups cannot be subject to sanctions. In addition, States often have
difficulty identifying the specific terrorists responsible for an attack,3 which
prevents the imposition of individual legal liability.32 Consequently, the
flexibility involved in holding terrorist States accountable has also provided
a significant basis to shift the international community's focus away from
terrorists to their State sponsors.
Although the international community should remain focused on holding
States accountable for terrorism,33 the international legal system lacks a
structured framework with which to do so. State accountability is a well-
recognized principle of international law.34 However, State responsibility "is
not regulated by any well-established precepts,"35 and thus lacks a cohesive
structure in which to examine violations of international law. Because of this
haphazard organization, it remains uncertain whether the international
community or an individual State can legally hold another sovereign State
accountable for sponsoring or supporting terrorist activity. Despite the fact
that the system governing terrorism law is disorganized, a significant legal
basis nonetheless exists to hold States accountable for terrorist activity.
In an attempt to outline the legal framework establishing State
accountability, this comment examines both the history of terrorist law and
legal developments following September 11. Part II provides an overview of
terrorism: its definition, elements, levels and types of State-supported
terrorism, as well as historical examples of the varying levels of State
involvement in terrorism. Part III explores the various primary sources of
international law that impute accountability to States for sponsoring or
supporting terrorism.36 This part also analyzes the application of these sources
29. See infra Part V.
30. Cohan, supra note 1, at 85.
31. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT, supra note 11, at 37.
32. In the unusual case where terrorists are identified and captured, they may face
prosecution in either domestic courts or the new International Criminal Court.
33. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
34. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (Alvarez, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 44 (Alvarez, J., concurring).
36. International law encompasses both primary and secondary rules of State obligations.
Primary rules provide the substantive law governing State responsibility. Secondary rules
govern the attribution of primary rule violations to a State and the resulting legal consequences.
See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
2003]
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to terrorist States in light of modem terrorist techniques. The practicalities of
holding States responsible for terrorism are addressed in Part IV. Finally, Part
V provides a brief overview of the potential means to hold States accountable
for supporting terrorism as well as historical attempts to do so.
II. Overview of Terrorism
A. Defining a Complex Term
Although scholars, jurists, and politicians have made numerous attempts to
define "terrorism", the term continues to evade a comprehensive, yet precise,
definition.37 International Court of Justice Judge Baxter has stated, "We have
cause to regret that a legal concept of 'terrorism' was ever inflicted upon us.
The term is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative
legal purpose. 38 Indeed, the international community's failure to create a
comprehensive terrorism treaty exemplifies its correlative failure to define
terrorism.
39
The definition of terrorism varies among the States of the international
community, as each foreign State views terrorism from its own paradigm.4"
The failure to define terrorism lies partly in the fact that terrorism is a political
concept." Culture and politics, which vary greatly among States, lead to
definitions of terrorism ranging across a broad spectrum. Even the U.S.
government lacks a single definition for "terrorism", as each agency of the
government utilizes its own variation of the same basic elements.42 Ironically,
RESPONSIBILITY 14-16 (2002); REN LEFEBER, TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL
INTERFERENCE AND THE ORIGIN OF STATE LIABILITY 15 (1996).
37. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1998); Cohan, supra
note 1, at 78; Vogelson, supra note 5, at 73 (noting that the U.N. Working Group, developed
to eliminate terrorism, failed to concur on a definition).
38. Richard R. Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV.
380, 380 (1974).
39. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented
Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 91 (2002) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Legal Control].
40. Lt. Col. James P. Terry, USMC, Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Law-Policy
Analysis, 36 NAVALL. REV. 159, 161 (1986).
41. Joseph Dellapenna, Legal Remedies for TerroristActs, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'LL. & COM.
13, 13 (1996); W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J.
INT'LL. 3, 9 (1999).
42. Tomis Kapitan, The Terrorism of "Terrorism", in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 47, 48; see Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism -
Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 240-41
(1995); Cohan, supra note 1, at 78-79. U.S. federal law defines terrorism as "premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups




according to several definitions adopted by U.S. agencies, "the United States
War for Independence, the Gulf War (Desert Storm), the Contra insurgency
in Nicaragua, and the anti-Castro insurgency supported by the United States
are all examples of terrorism."43 The variation in terrorism definitions creates
substantial confusion when the definition must be subsequently applied to
more complex issues of international law. Nonetheless, terrorism
encompasses certain basic elements, which lend themselves to a workable
definition for purposes of examining State accountability within this comment.
Legal scholars and politicians generally agree that international terrorism
incorporates four elements: (1) use of force or threat of force (2) in an attempt
to cause fear (3) to bring about a political objective and (4) achieve global
attention.' 4 Some scholars further limit this definition to the targeting of
civilians 45 or other targets selected for their ability to achieve a political
objective. 6 Indeed, the international community often identifies terrorists by
their selection of targets not normally pursued in traditional warfare. 47 Unlike
domestic terrorism, international terrorism targets foreign subjects, takes place
in foreign States, or attempts to affect foreign political policy.48 Most
importantly, as compared to domestic terrorism, international terrorism often
involves the support of States.49
B. Levels of Sponsorship
While State action itself often encompasses the basic elements of terrorism,
allowing States to be classified as terrorists themselves,5" a fundamental
distinction exists between "State terrorism" and "State-sponsored terrorism."
Unlike "State terrorism," in which the terrorist actors are representatives of
the State, non-State actors carry out "State-sponsored terrorism" with the
support or sponsorship of a State government.5 Under international law, "[a]
state official who commits an act of terrorism in his official capacity is
involving citizens or the territory of more than one country." Id. § 2656f(d)(2).
43. Beres, supra note 42, at 240 (citation omitted).
44. Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on US": International Law and
Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'LL.J. 153, 162 (1994); Cohan, supra note
1, at 80, 84.
45. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the Charter
Framework, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 735, 740 (2002); Kapitan, supra note 42, at 48.
46. Terry, supra note 40, at 161.
47. Id.
48. See Lt. Cmdr. Michael Franklin Lohr, USN, LegalAnalysis of U.S. Military Responses
to State-Sponsored International Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 5 (1985).
49. Gross, supra note 12, at 444; Lohr, supra note 48, at 5.
50. Beck & Arend, supra note 44, at 165.
51. Bassiouni, Legal Control, supra note 39, at 84.
2003]
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presumed to have acted with the authority of the [S]tate, rendering the [S]tate
itself liable. 52 Consequently, because State terrorism does not raise questions
of State liability, this comment instead focuses on State-sponsored terrorism.
Within the scope of State-sponsored terrorism, a further division by the
level of State involvement in the terrorist group pervades the relationship
between a State and non-State terrorist actors. While scholars disagree as to
how many levels of State support exist,53 the levels are generally condensed
into three categories: "(1) terrorist actors with state sponsorship; (2) terrorist
actors with state support, but without immediate state sponsorship; [and] (3)
terrorist actors with state toleration, but without state support or
sponsorship."'M
"State sponsorship" involves "'active planning, direction, and control"' of
terrorist activity.55 "State support" requires a less significant level of
assistance than sponsorship, but includes supply of "intelligence, weapons,
diplomatic assets, funds, or rhetorical endorsement."56 "State toleration"
recognizes an even weaker level of involvement, existing when the State
acquiesces to the terrorist group's presence without providing sponsorship or
support. Regardless of the extent of the State's involvement with a terrorist
organization, all terrorist groups "have some state association, for terrorist
actors must act within a system of sovereign states and virtually always have
bases within states."58 Accordingly, it is logical that more States merely
tolerate terrorist organizations than actively participate in State-sponsorship
of terrorism.
In addition to the general variation in levels of assistance, the types of
assistance also differ among state-terrorist relationships. Historically,
assistance has involved the provision of direct support, intelligence, training,
diplomatic assets, advanced technology, weapons and explosives,
transportation, territory, funding, tacit support, or propaganda and political
support. 9 These categories are neither exclusive nor dispositive, as many
52. Sara N. Scheideman, Note, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism, 50
SYRACUSE L. REv. 249, 261 (2000); see also Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism
After September I I th: State Responsibility, Self-Defense and Other Responses, 11 CARDOZO
J. INT'L& COMP. L. 1, 7-8 (2003).
53. Gross, supra note 12, at 444-45.
54. Beck & Arend, supra note 44, at 164; accord Cohan, supra note 1, at 90-91; Gross,
supra note 12, at 446.
55. Beck & Arend, supra note 44, at 165 (quoting MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT, supra note
11, at 34); see also Abbott, supra note 18, at 294.
56. Beck & Arend, supra note 44, at 165.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 163; see also Brown, supra note 52, at 4; Gross, supra note 12, at 444.




States offer numerous types and combinations of assistance to terrorist
organizations.' Often, State sponsorship or support involves training,
financing, and tacit support, among other combinations of assistance.
C. Examples of State Support and Sponsorship of Terrorism
The level of State involvement in terrorist activity varies significantly, as
a comparison of the governments of Iran, Libya, Syria, and the Sudan
demonstrate. According to the U.S. State Department, Iran provides the most
active sponsorship of terrorism in the world.6 Iran has funded and provided
training and weapons to numerous terrorist organizations, including
Hezbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and Hamas.62 In 1996 alone, Iran provided
Hezbollah with enough weapons to fill three 747 cargo jets every month.63
The Iranian State also funded and created several terrorist training camps in
Syrian territory to train these groups as well as the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). 4 Iran not only
provided close to $50 million for the camps, it also supplied Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) soldiers to run their operations. 6,
Iran's budget allows for a significant financial contribution to terrorism
each year. Between the IRGC and Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security
(MOIS), approximately $100 million goes to support Hezbollah alone each
year.' Hamas also receives $15 million from Iran each month. As noted, Iran
provides territory used to train terrorists and to serve as protection and a base
for further operations. In 2002, the State Department also reported that al
Qaeda utilized transit routes through Iran to access entry to Afghanistan.6 8
Romano, Note, Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reviving the
Doctrine of a State of Necessity, 87 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1029-30 (1999); Scheideman, supra note
52, at 261.
60. See infra Part IIC.
61. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2001 (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/20O01htmll10249pf.htm [hereinafter PATTERNS OFGLOBAL
TERRORISM: 2001].
62. Id.; see also Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D.D.C.
2000); William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with... Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on
State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 105, 107-08 (2002).
63. HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 193.
64. U.S. Policy Toward Syria and the Syria Accountability Act: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on the Middle East & South Asia, Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 59 (2002)
(statement of Matthew A. Levitt, Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
[hereinafter Levitt Statement].
65. Id.
66. Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F. Supp. 2d 260, 274 (D.D.C. 2002).
67. Romano, supra note 59, at 1029.
68. PATTERNS OFGLOBALTERRORISM: 2001, supra note 61.
2003]
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Most significantly, Iran provides substantial assistance to terrorists, in effect
controlling their activities, by developing their attacks and designating the
actors for each assault.69 The IRGC and the MOIS also assist in the planning
of terrorist activity.7" Through the exercise of control, Iran actively sponsors
terrorist activity.
In Libya, leader Moammar Kaddafi' s support has involved the provision of
money and weapons both within the State and outside of Libyan borders.7 He
has provided numerous terrorist groups, including the PFLP-GC 2 and the Abu
Nidal organization 73 with protection, weapons, and money.74 In addition,
Kaddafi provides terrorist training, which, as early as 1986, had already
educated over 7000 terrorists.75 In the mid- 1980s, Libyan financial support for
terrorist training camps amounted to approximately one hundred million
dollars per year.76 Kaddafi also clearly demonstrated propagandist support
when he claimed the right of Libya to carry on terrorist activity in the United
States.77 Evidence acquired by the United States has additionally shown direct
Libyan support of, and even control over, the bombing of a German disco in
1986.78 Finally, while Kaddafi has denied supporting the 1988 bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, a Scottish court has convicted
a Libyan state employee of the attack.79 The perpetrator was allegedly an
agent of the Libyan Intelligence Service. 0 Although Libyan actions generally
include only state support, the Libyan government's involvement rises to the
69. Terry, supra note 40, at 165; see also HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 194.
70. PATTERNS OFGLOBALTERRORISM: 2001, supra note 61.
71. Terry, supra note 40, at 165.
72. The PFLP-GC supports the Palestinian movement and uses terrorism to attack Israeli
targets. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2002, supra note 14, at 118.
73. Abu Nidal, also known as Fatah, targets the PLO and carries out attacks on the United
States, Europe, and the Middle East. Id. at 101.
74. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177, 180-81 (1987).
75. Terry, supra note 40, at 165.
76. Intoccia, supra note 74, at 181.
77. Id. at 182.
78. The Libyan People's Bureau actually carried out the attack on orders from Tripoli,
which implicates Libyan control over the operation. Id. at 196-97.
79. Libyan Convicted in Bombing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2001, at 1.
80. Marcella David, Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine
for Application in the World Court, 40 HARv. INT'L L.J. 81, 94 (1999); Libyan Convicted in
Bombing, supra note 79, at 1. Despite Kaddafi's continued denial of Libya's direct role in the
bombing, Libya has accepted responsibility based on the perpetrator's status as a State
employee. Alan Sipress & John Mintz, Libya Accepts Responsibility for Bombing over




level of sponsorship when it encompasses control over the terrorist acts, as
allegedly it did during the German disco and the Pan Am bombings.
In a similar manner, Syria remains actively involved in both supporting and
sponsoring terrorism.8 In the past, Syria directed terrorism and used its own
agents to carry out numerous attacks.82 More recently, the use of Syrian
territory to harbor terrorists provides some of the State's most substantial
support to terrorism.83 The PFLP operates terrorist training camps south of
Damascus, where other terrorist organizations also train. 4 At one camp,
Syrian officials actually observe the operations to ensure the safety of the
trainees." Arms, training, and diplomatic assistance are also given to
terrorists whose headquarters are in Damascus. 6 From their Syrian command
centers, the terrorist organizations "incite, recruit, train, coordinate, and direct
terrorism."" In addition, Damascus has promised to provide direct financial
aid to Hamas to promote suicide bombings.88 Recently, al Qaeda has spread
into Syrian territory, where it finds parties willing to support it.89
Most significantly, Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad, controls much of the
terrorist activity emanating from Syria by approving suggested attacks and
ruling the terrorist bases from which they originate.90 Moreover, reports
indicate that the Syrian army has incorporated the Hezbollah' s9' military units
into its structure. 92 Thus, the Syrian connection to terrorism also involves a
significant level of control over the terrorist activities. Syrian involvement
rises to the level of sponsorship as a result of the State's ability to dictate
terrorist activity.
The Sudan does not participate in terrorist activity as pervasively as Iran,
Libya, or Syria. Instead, the Sudan primarily provides territory for al Qaeda,
81. Levitt Statement, supra note 64, at 60.
82. Abbott, supra note 18, at 296.
83. See generally HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 195.
84. Levitt Statement, supra note 64, at 58.
85. Id.
86. Terry, supra note 40, at 166; see also PATTERNS OFGLOBAL TERRORISM: 2002, supra
note 14, at 81; PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2001, supra note 61.
87. Levitt Statement, supra note 64, at 55. However, Syria denies involvement of the
Damascus groups in terrorism. Instead, it claims that the groups "undertake only political and
informational activities." PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2002, supra note 14, at 81.
88. Levitt Statement, supra note 64, at 56.
89. Id.
90. Terry, supra note 40, at 165.
91. Hezbollah focuses on the liberation of Israel and the establishment of Islamic rule. It
has carried out numerous terrorist attacks against the United States and Israel, including the
bombing of the U.S. Embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM: 2002, supra note 14, at 108.
92. Levitt Statement, supra note 64, at 56.
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Egyptian al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Palestine
Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. 93  From their Sudanese bases, these groups
principally provide support and logistics to their main operations in other
States.94 However, some sources claim that these groups use Sudanese
territory to run terrorist training camps.95 Thus, Sudanese support for terrorist
groups does not rival the substantial involvement of Iran, Syria, or Libya. The
Sudan is therefore properly labeled a State tolerant of terrorist groups.
As these examples demonstrate, States provide significant levels of
sponsorship and support for some of the most active and destructive terrorist
groups in the world. Nevertheless, because of the historically varying levels
of State assistance, the international community and other States have
responded inconsistently with attempts to hold States accountable for
sponsoring or supporting terrorist activity.
As this comment explains, numerous sources of international law impose
a duty on States to refrain from supporting or sponsoring terrorism, thus, a
State assumes accountability for providing such sponsorship or support.96
However, State accountability becomes less clear as the relationship between
the State and the terrorist cell weakens, and the evidence to prove the
existence of such a relationship disappears.9' Therefore, State sponsors should
logically assume greater accountability than States that merely acquiesce to
the presence of terrorist groups within their borders.
Under international law, States do not assume complete responsibility for
the conduct of individuals within their borders.98 Instead, a State's
accountability depends on the individual's or the organization's relationship
to the State. Therefore, as the State's connection to terrorist activity grows
stronger, more evidence normally exists to connect the State to terrorism,
allowing the international community or another State to more easily impose
accountability."
93. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2000 (2001), available at
http://www.state.govls/ctlrlslpgtrpt/20001 244 lpf.htm; Michael Rubin, Sudan Hides Its Regime
of Terror Behind a Mask of Diplomacy, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 19, 2001, at 12, available at
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org [hereinafter Rubin, Sudan].
94. Id.; see also Michael Rubin, Engaged to Terror, JERUSALEM POST, June 11, 2002, at
9, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org.
95. Rubin, Sudan, supra note 93, at 12.
96. Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under
International Law, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 582 (2002).
97. See Scheideman, supra note 52, at 261.
98. Id. at 260.




At the same time, serious security implications exist for holding States
accountable only for high levels of terrorist support." Even a State that
provides minimal support, acquiescing only to the presence of terrorist groups
within its territory, allows terrorism to continue unabated and thereby furthers
the threat of terrorism to international peace and security. As a result, this
comment attempts to determine the lowest level of sponsorship or support that
can legally create State accountability under international law.
Ill. Imposing State Responsibility Under International Law
According to U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel James Terry, the
difficulty with combating terrorism "is not defining terrorism, or even the
conceptual elements of international law condemning terrorism. Rather, it is
the vagueness and confusion that cloud the interpretation of the law with
respect to the [S]tate support provided."' 0 ' Recognizing this weakness of
international law, this comment attempts to explain the relevant international
law in the context of State-sponsored and supported terrorism. Each source
of international law will be examined to demonstrate its applicability at each
level and type of State support. As a result, a framework will develop to allow
States and the international community to recognize whether they may
legitimately impose accountability based on each type of terrorist support or
sponsorship.
A. United Nations Charter
The U.N. Charter provides the strongest foundation for imposing liability
on States for sponsoring or supporting terrorism. In the past, the United
Nations Security Council has invoked Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, based
on breach of peace, to impose sanctions on States for backing terrorism.'0 2
Because assistance of terrorist activity results in serious threats to
international peace and security, Chapter VII provides the Security Council
with the right to respond through either economic and diplomatic sanctions,
or to take other necessary action to restore peace and security.0 3
However, while Chapter VII provides the means to hold States accountable,
Article 2, section 4 of the U.N. Charter provides the legal justification for
attributing terrorism to a State. According to Article 2, section 4, States have
a duty to refrain from making threats of or employing force against a foreign
100. See Sofaer, supra note 9, at 91.
101. Terry, supra note 40, at 161.
102. Bassiouni, Legal Control, supra note 39, at 96-97.
103. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41-42.
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State. 14 In the realm of terrorism, a State blatantly exhibits force if its agents
carry out terrorist attacks because the State itself employs the use of force.
Therefore, under a basic interpretation, Article 2, paragraph 4 clearly applies
to State terrorism.
Indeed, even direct State sponsorship of terrorism appears to invoke State
accountability under the Charter. Because the State controls the terrorist
activity, it, in effect, directs the use of force against a foreign State.
Therefore, the acts of the terrorists are attributable to the State sponsor itself.
As such, a State sponsor of terrorism violates the U.N. Charter.
B. United Nations Resolutions
While Article 2, paragraph 4 has created State accountability for terrorism
since its inception, the U.N. did not recognize the source of this duty until
1992. 05 In Resolution 748, as ajustification for imposing economic sanctions
on Libya, the U.N. Security Council stated that
in accordance with the principle in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter of the United Nations, every State has the duty to refrain
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist
acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts."0
Responding to Libya's ties to terrorism and its protection of the accused Pan
Am Flight 103 bombers, the Security Council recognized that State support
of terrorism presents a threat to international peace and security. 1°7 Thus, the
Security Council clarified in the Resolution that Article 2, paragraph 4 of the
U.N. Charter extends to State sponsorship, support, and toleration of terrorist
activity." Therefore, the international community now recognizes that the
U.N. Charter applies "to all forms of state involvement, participation, and
acquiescence in terrorism."'" Additionally, under Article 2, paragraph 4,
accountability extends to a State whose involvement is limited to tacit
approval of terrorist activity within its borders."0
104. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
105. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., 3063d mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. S/RFS/748 (1992).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Beck & Arend, supra note 44, at 172. The United States also invoked Article 2, section
4 and its right to self defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter in April 1986, when it
claimed that Libya was responsible for the terrorist attack on a German dance club. Specifically,
the United States justified this imposition of liability by claiming that Libya had violated Article
2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter. Beard, supra note 96, at 561.
109, Beard, supra note 96, at 580.




Prior to 1992, although the U.N. recognized that a duty to refrain from
supporting terrorism existed, it failed to acknowledge that Article 2, Section
4 provided such duty. U.N. statements addressing this duty shaped the
international community's modem understanding of State accountability for
supporting or sponsoring terrorism arising from Article 2, paragraph 4.
Consequently, an examination of those previous U.N. statements provides
significant guidance for understanding State accountability.
A States' duty to refrain from supporting terrorist activity was originally
recognized by the U.N. in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Declaration on Friendly
Relations)."' The Declaration on Friendly Relations, considered by many to
provide significant guidance to interpreting the U.N. Charter," 2 affirms that
a State's demonstration of force, in any form of aggression,"' violates both
international law and the U.N. Charter." 4 It also asserts that the use of
aggression by a State breaches international peace and therefore creates
responsibility under international law." 5 Applying these principles to
terrorism, the U.N. concluded that international law imposes a duty on States
"to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in ...
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts.""' 6 The U.N.
employed similar language when it later composed Resolution 748, discussed
previously, which explicitly recognized that the source of this duty arose from
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter. The language common with
Resolution 748 supports the proposition that a State is responsible for
sponsoring terrorism through all means of assistance, from direct support to
tacit acquiescence. 17
Like the Declaration on Friendly Relations, the U.N. Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of
States (Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention)" 8 also identified
11I. Declaration on Fi'iendly Relations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No.
28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970).
112. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT, supra note 11, at 34.
113. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 93.
114. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note I 11.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Abbott, supra note 18, at 300.
118. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal
Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/36/103 (198 1) [hereinafter Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention].
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State action supporting terrorism as a violation of the U.N. Charter." 9 The
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention again recognized the duty
of States to refrain from the use or threat of force against another State.12
However, the U.N. chose not to employ the same language as the Declaration
on Friendly Relations, instead directing States to prevent the use of their
territories for terrorist activity. Specifically, the Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention acknowledged the duty of a State (1) to make
certain that its territory is not employed to infringe on the sovereignty or
stability of another State; (2) to discontinue the use of terrorist tactics; and (3)
"to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups."
121
The first requirement, that the State prevent the use of its territory as a
means to threaten the integrity of another State, indicates that State provision
of territory to terrorist organizations creates State accountability. Where a
terrorist group uses a State's territory to further an attack on another State, it
has used the territory as a means to threaten the integrity of another State. The
second provision expressly forbids State terrorism, and therefore reaffirms a
State's accountability for using terrorist tactics itself. In the third instance, the
U.N. outlaws all State support for terrorism, including tacit support, under the
U.N. Charter. Because the language encompasses sponsorship, support, and
tolerance, activities that span the spectrum of State assistance fall under this
prohibition. Like the other declarations, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility
of Intervention reaffirms the accountability of States for all forms of terrorist
sponsorship and support.
General Assembly Resolution 40/61, commonly referred to as Measures to
Prevent International Terrorism, 2 2 foreshadowed the conclusions of U.N.
Resolution 748. Like Resolution 748, which applied Article 2, section 4 to the
duty of States with respect to terrorism, General Assembly Resolution 40/61
also recognized the international legal obligation of States to desist from
supporting terrorism by providing supplies or acquiescing to the presence of
terrorist groups within the State's borders.'23 Specifically, Resolution 40/61
provides that States have a duty under international law not to "organiz[e],
instigat[e], assist[] or participat[e] in terrorist acts in other States."'
' 24
Therefore, the Measures to Prevent International Terrorism reaffirms that
States assume accountability for all forms of support and sponsorship of
terrorism, including tacit support.
119. Intoccia, supra note 74, at 195.
120. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra note 118.
121. Id.






General Assembly Resolution 3314, entitled the Definition of Aggression,
further reveals the applicability of Article 2, section 4 to State sponsorship of
terrorist groups. 25  According to the Definition of Aggression, a State
breaches the U.N. Charter by carrying out an act of aggression.
26
Furthermore, Resolution 3314 specifically recognizes that an act of aggression
"gives rise to international responsibility."'' 27 However, the Definition of
Aggression not only prohibits States from sending armed units to act in
aggression against other States, it also proscribes any "substantial
involvement" by States in those armed units. 28 Therefore, any State that
supports terrorist organizations through "substantial involvement" violates
Article 2, section 4 of the U.N. Charter under the Definition of Aggression.
Nonetheless, the definition of "substantial State involvement" remains open
to interpretation. In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 29 the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.) reasoned that the Definition of Aggression did not
include "assistance... in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical
or other support."' 3 ° Although such support may qualify as a threat or use of
force or as violating sovereignty, the court refused to define State support as
"substantial State involvement" falling under the Definition of Aggression,
which would allow target States to respond in self-defense.' 3 ' Therefore, the
I.C.J. requires a substantial relationship between a State and a terrorist group
before it satisfies the definition of aggression to violate the U.N. Charter.
Nonetheless, the travaux preparatoires 132 to the U.N. Definition of
Aggression indicate that substantial involvement includes support of armed
bands.' While the drafting parties disagreed as to the required level of
involvement, the Definition reflects a compromise between requiring a State
to actually send armed units and finding accountability for "organising,
supporting or directing" armed bands or terrorist activity.'
As Julius Stone, a prominent scholar on the law of armed force, concluded,
a State would therefore assume accountability for hosting terrorist groups that
125. Terry, supra note 40, at 169.
126. Id. at 168-69.
127. Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, art.
5(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX) (1974).
128. Id.
129. 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
130. Id. at 104.
131. Id.
132. Preparatory materials.
133. JUUUS STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS: UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES TO
AGGRESSION 74 (1977).
134. Id. at 75.
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carry out terrorism against other states. 135 Prominent international law scholar
Ian Brownlie reiterated the view that "[t]he concept of armed bands is now
well established in the literature of international law, and support for, or
toleration of activities of, such bands is a fairly constant feature of
enumerative and mixed definitions of aggression." 136 Thus, scholars generally
agree that State sponsorship, support, and toleration of terrorism seemingly
encompass aggression in violation of Article 2, section 4 of the U.N. Charter.
The U.N. General Assembly reiterated its intent to place accountability on
States for supporting terrorists in the 1994 Declaration on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism.'37 In this Declaration, which followed the
1998 terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa, the U.N. again declared the
duty of its members to "refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating,
financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activit[y]" within its borders.1
3 8
Like other instruments employing this language, the U.N. indicated that
accountability therefore applies to a wide spectrum of State involvement in
terrorist activity, from State sponsorship to State acquiescence.
Immediately following September 11, the U.N. Security Council expanded
the requirements previously imposed on States to refrain from supporting
terrorism. Under Resolution 1373, States now have the obligation to
"[r]efrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities...
involved in terrorist acts."'139 According to this language, Resolution 1373
prohibits States from providing terrorists with financial support or
protection,"4 and furthermore creates State accountability for acquiescence to
a terrorist organization's presence within a State's borders. Consequently, as
numerous U.N. resolutions and the Charter demonstrate, international
accountability exists for State sponsorship, support, or even tacit approval of
terrorist organizations.
C. Terrorism Treaty Law
Although no comprehensive treaty has yet addressed terrorism, thirteen
different multilateral treaties address the legal responses to attacks on specific
terrorist targets.' In addition, regional organizations have also tried to
135. See id. at 76.
136. Ian Brownie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 712, 718 (1958).
137. G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60
(1994).
138. Id. annex art. 5(a).
139. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., art. 2(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(2001).
140. Hoye, supra note 62, at 106.




combat terrorist activity with regional instruments.'42 However, of these
regional agreements, the European Convention on Terrorism is the only
agreement enforced by its parties.'43 Hence, little treaty law exists to impose
accountability for terrorism.1" Furthermore, the existing treaties focus on
extraditing individual terrorists.'45 Therefore, treaty law lacks a sufficient
basis to hold state sponsors and supporters accountable.
D. Judicial Opinions
Despite the substantial support under Article 2, section 4 of the U.N.
Charter for the blanket imposition of liability on States providing any form of
terrorism assistance,"4 international judicial decisions have limited actual
State responsibility for supporting terrorist activity. Early cases, such as the
Corfu Channel Case'47 and the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran,48 held States accountable for supporting
terrorism. However, Nicaragua v. United States subsequently placed
significant limitations on the ability of the international community to impose
liability on States for terrorist support.
1. Corfu Channel Case
In 1949, the I.C.J. held that a State violates international law, and thus
assumes responsibility for acts within its territory, if it knows of the existence
of a threat and fails to act to prevent the danger. 149 Specifically, the court held
Albania accountable for mine damage to British warships on the basis that
Albania knew of the presence of the mines within its territorial waters. 5o The
I.C.J. found that the source of Albania's responsibility in the Corfu Channel
Case arose from "general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary
considerations of humanity .... and every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States."''
at 169.
142. Bassiouni, Legal Control, supra note 39, at 91.
143. Id. at 92.
144. See Hoye, supra note 62, at 108-09.
145. Reisman, supra note 41, at 28.
146. Although U.N. Resolutions lack legally binding effect, they nonetheless express the
sentiments of the international community. Beck & Arend, supra note 44, at 172.
147. 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
148. 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
149. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22-23.
150. Scheideman, supra note 52, at 263.
151. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
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The conclusion that Albania knew of the minefield's existence was key to
the I.C.J.'s decision. However, the court indicated that it could not assume
that Albania had knowledge of the mines solely because the minefield lay in
Albanian territory.15 The court reasoned that a State does not assume
responsibility for activity emanating from within its borders simply because
it exercises control over that territory. 5 3 Because the mere existence of a
threat within a State's borders does not automatically notify the State of its
presence, responsibility cannot be imputed under international law without
further proof of the State's knowledge.
However, the I.C.J. found that the Albanian government did actually know
of the minefield's existence within its territorial waters, because the
government closely monitored the waters where the mines were laid.' 54 The
court examined the practical layout of the territory in question, as well as the
requirements of the mining operation, before concluding that Albania must
have known of the mines' presence.'55 As a result, Albania's failure to
prevent the terrorists from contravening the rights of the United Kingdom
imputed accountability to the State.
156
Applying the authority provided by the Corfu Channel Case to the current
international crisis of state-sponsored terrorism, a State cannot knowingly
acquiesce to terrorist activity within its borders without assuming liability.
Because the I.C.J. held Albania responsible based on its actual knowledge of
the danger, modern States therefore only become accountable for failing to act
when a terrorist threat is known to them. The facts of the Corfu Channel Case
also limit the responsibility of States to the presence of danger within their
own territories. However, unlike the Corfu Channel Case, terrorist groups
carry out much of the terrorist activity today on foreign soil, not within the
boundaries of the State that acquiesces to the presence of the terrorist group.
Therefore, under the narrow holding of the Corfu Channel Case alone, a State
would not assume international responsibility for acts of groups residing
within its territory where those acts are executed outside its territory.
2. United States v. Iran
Thirty years after the Corfu Channel Case, the I.C.J. found a State
responsible for openly approving of terrorism, despite the fact that the State
152. Id.
153. Id. However, international law assumes that a state knows or has a duty to know of
illegal activity within areas of its territory where local authorities exercise control. Id. at 44
(Alvarez, J., concurring); see also Scheideman, supra note 52, at 264.
154. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 19.
155. Id. at 20-21.




did not order the terrorist activity."5 7 The Iran Hostage Case involved the
seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by an armed group that took all parties
inside the embassy hostage. 5 ' At that time, the Iranian personnel assigned to
protect the embassy failed to take any steps to prevent the seizure or respond
to the embassy's repeated requests for help.'59
Subsequent to the hostage standoff and embassy takeover, the I.C.J. held
Iran responsible for its role in the event. The court recognized that Iran failed
to respond to the crisis despite its obligations under the Vienna Conventions
on Diplomatic and Consular Relations."6 In considering the extent to which
the court could hold the Iranian State responsible for the seizure of the
embassy, the I.C.J. noted that it could hold Iran liable for the acts of the
independent militant group only if that organization had "acted on behalf of
the State, having been charged by some competent organ of the Iranian State
to carry out a specific operation."'
' 61
In justifying its actions, the embassy's militant attackers had relied on a
statement by Iran's leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, who called on students
"to expand with all their might their attacks against the United States."'
' 62
Although the Iranian leader urged students to use force against the United
States, the I.C.J. refused to find that his statements authorized the militant
group to overtake the embassy, noting that the group had taken full credit for
the operation without making any attribution to the Iranian State. 163 The I.C.J.
also noted that congratulatory remarks made to the terrorists by Khomeini did
not make the Iranian State subject to responsibility for the attack. 
64
Despite the I.C.J.'s decision not to hold Iran accountable for the initial
embassy attack, the court found that Iran violated specific duties under
international law that led to the imposition of State responsibility. 165 The
I.C.J. reasoned that the militant group initially responsible for the attack on the
embassy became an agent of Iran after Khomeini endorsed the operation and
157. Scheideman, supra note 52, at 262.
158. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 12
(May 24).
159. Id. at 12-13.
160. Id. at 30-31. Unlike many terrorism cases, the Iran Hostage Case involved the explicit
breach of an international treaty. Rather than address the substantive primary law of
responsibility in the treaty, therefore, the I.C.J. instead addressed the secondary law of State
attribution.
161. ld. at 29.
162. Id. at 29-30.
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contributed to its perpetuation. 66 As a result, the I.C.J. ordered Iran to make
reparations to the United States after ceasing occupation of the embassy and
releasing the hostages.1
67
Based on the plain language of the Iran Hostage decision, only State
terrorism imputes responsibility to a State, because only then has an agent
carried out a terrorist activity on behalf of the State. However, the court's
reasoning also transformed a terrorist group into an agent of the State when
the State publicly supported the terrorist group and provided assistance for its
continuation. Under this standard, States may be held accountable for actively
supporting terrorism through the provision of propaganda and political
support. The Iran Hostage decision, in essence, finds State terrorism where
the State provided only support or sponsorship. However, tacit support is
seemingly insufficient under this standard to impute State responsibility.
3. Nicaragua v. United States
In Nicaragua v. United States, the I.C.J. reiterated the Iran Hostage Case
requirement that terrorists act on behalf of the State for State liability to
attach. 168 Nicaragua v. United States involved U.S. support of military and
paramilitary activities taken against Nicaragua in an attempt to overthrow the
Nicaraguan government. In 1979, armed opposition, namely the Frente
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) overthrew the Nicaraguan
government led by President Somoza. 69 In response to the installation of this
new government, armed opponents created guerilla forces for the purpose of
destroying the new regime.170 Although the United States originally supported
the new FSLN coalition government, it soon opposed the regime and
supported the opposition Contra forces.'
7'
Among other claims, Nicaragua argued that the United States had violated
Article 2, section 4 of the U.N. Charter by "recruiting, training, arming,
equipping, financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting,
aiding, and directing military and paramilitary actions in and against
Nicaragua."'' 72 While the I.C.J. established that the United States had provided
support to the opposition forces, the level of support evaded factual
166. Id. at 35.
167. Id. at 45.
168. Beard, supra note 96, at 579 n.70.
169. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 20-21 (June 27).
170. Id. at 21.
171. Id.




conclusion.'73 Because of the secrecy of the support, the court had to decide
which of the involved parties had performed an established act. 74 The court
noted that the difficulty was "not the legal process of imputing the act to a
particular State for the purpose of establishing responsibility, but the prior
process of tracing material proof of the identity of the perpetrator."'7 As a
result, the evidentiary aspects of the case made the imposition of liability
nearly impossible.
Despite the difficulties in establishing the actual support provided by the
United States to the Contras, the I.C.J. concluded that the United States
supplied speedboats, personnel, and weapons used in a number of attacks on
the Nicaraguan infrastructure.' 76 The court could not determine if the U.S.
military played an active role, but it did decide that American agents had
"participated in the planning, direction, support and execution of the
operations," even if Americans themselves did not execute the attacks.'77
Accordingly, the I.C.J. imposed liability on the United States for its
involvement in those specific direct acts involving U.S. personnel.
However, in instances where the United States supplied weapons,
intelligence, necessities, such as meals and uniforms, training, financial
support for communications and logistics,'78 and organized the paramilitary
acts, but did not execute the actions itself,"' the I.C.J. refused to impute
responsibility to the United States. ° In reaching this conclusion, the court
indicated that the Contras must have acted on behalf of the United States in
order for the United States to be accountable for their activities. 18
According to the Nicaragua decision, a terrorist group acts on behalf of the
State where the State effectively controls its activity. 82 However, because the
United States could not control the paramilitary forces "in all fields"'83 and
did not direct or enforce the Contras' activities," it avoided liability for its
sponsorship and support. This conclusion remained true despite the fact that
173. See id. at 50-51.
174. Id. at 38-39.
175. Id. at 39.
176. Id. at 50.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 59.
179. Id. at 60.
180. Id. at 64.
181. Id. at 62.
182. Id. at65.
183. Id. at 62.
184. Id. at 64.
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at some intervals the Contras depended entirely on the United States for their
survival.'85
Under the interpretation set forth by the I.C.J. in Nicaragua v. United
States, Article 2, section 4 of the U.N. Charter imposes liability only on
"[S]tates that are closely affiliated with terrorist organizations, directly
support their activities, and assist them in orchestrating devastating attacks
against other [S]tates.' 86 Consequently, if a State is not involved in State
terrorism, it must effectively control the actions of the actual perpetrators to
be held accountable, regardless of the level of support it provides. Indeed, the
Nicaragua decision reflects the I.C.J.'s determination that a State incurs
liability only for State sponsorship of terrorism. Because the I.C.J. refused to
impose State responsibility without greater U.S. control over the terrorist
forces, the Nicaragua decision communicates the message that the I.C.J. will
hold few States accountable for supporting or acquiescing to terrorist
activity.187 Nonetheless, numerous other sources of international law support
the proposition that a State does have a duty not to support terrorism or to
acquiesce to terrorist organizations within its borders.'88
E. Human Rights Law
Because state-sponsored terrorism often targets civilian populations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),' 89 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),9 ' the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,' 9 ' the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,'92 and the American




186. Beard, supra note 96, at 579.
187. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 101.
188. id. at 102.
189. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
190. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
191. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
192. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res.
XXX, O.A.S. Official Rec., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6.
193. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.




According to Article 3 of the UDHR, "[e]veryone has the right to life,
liberty and the security of person."' 95 Similarly, the ICCPR provides for the
protection of the life and security of all human beings.'96 The European and
American regional instruments also reflect this fundamental right to life and
security.'97 Indeed, "every instrument or agreement that has attempted to
define the scope of international human rights has 'recognized a right to
life.""' 198 As the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
recognizes, terrorism threatens the fundamental human rights to life and
security. 199 Terrorist activity therefore violates the UDHR, the ICCPR, and
other human rights instruments. 2°° By supporting or sponsoring terrorist
activity, States thereby contribute to the deprivation of human rights. As
parties to these treaties, States have a binding obligation to observe the
treaties' provisions.' Even as mere signatories, States have a duty not to
defeat the object and purpose of the treaties.0 2 By supporting and sponsoring
terrorism, States thereby assume accountability for violating human rights
treaty law.2°3
Several international instruments addressing terrorism also recognize the
violation of basic human rights caused by terrorist activity. Despite the fact
that it did not directly refer to terrorism's violation of human rights, General
195. UDHR, supra note 189, art. 3, at 72.
196. ICCPR, supra note 190, arts. 6, 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174-75.
197. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 193, arts. 4, 7, 1144 U.N.T.S. at
145, 147; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 191, arts. 2, 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224, 226; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man, supra note 192, art. I.
198. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D. Mass. 1995).
199. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,081, at 4, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205,206; see also Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts
of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of
International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 3957, 10 I.L.M. 255, 255.
200. Although the UDHR's provisions are not directly binding on States, the Declaration
nonetheless places an obligatory duty on States as a reflection of customary international law.
NATALIE KAUFMAN HEVENER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN 63 (1983);
Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 442 (1989); see also Richard B. Lillich, Invoking
International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 394-96 (1985).
201. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
339 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
202. Id. art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336.
203. States that are neither signatories nor parties to human rights treaties nonetheless have
an obligation under international law to protect fundamental human rights. Because the UDHR
reflects customary international law, it is binding on all States, regardless of their status as
parties or signatories. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L&COMP. L. 287, 317-51 (1995/1996).
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Assembly Resolution 40/61 indicated that terrorism "endanger[s] or take[s]
innocent human lives, jeopardize[s] fundamental freedoms and seriously
impair[s] the dignity of human beings."2 " Furthermore, the U.N. Declaration
on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism specifically acknowledged
that the violence carried out by terrorist groups violates principles of human
rights.2" 5 As these instruments indicate, States may therefore be held
accountable for violating fundamental principles of human rights by assisting
terrorist groups. Unfortunately, none of these instruments define the
necessary level of involvement to make a State accountable. Therefore, it
remains unclear whether support or acquiescence are sufficient to create
accountability.
F. Customary International Law
Customary international law reflects the widespread and consistent actions
of States performed through a sense of legal obligation."° With respect to
terrorism, customary international law imposes a duty on States to "exercise
due diligence" to prevent the use of their territory to injure another State.2 7
The arbitral decision of the Island of Palmas, in applying customary
international law, noted that territorial sovereignty imposes a corollary duty
on States to respect the integrity of other States.20 ' However, the qualified
nature of this duty requires only that a State use due diligence to prevent
potential harm.209 As Permanent Court of International Justice Judge Moore
noted, a State must exercise due diligence within its borders to protect other
States and individuals from criminal acts.210
Therefore, according to customary international law, a State need not
always successfully prevent the use of its territory for terrorist activity.
Instead, a State assumes accountability only if it fails to act diligently to
eliminate terrorism from its territory.2 In other words, "Only when the
[S]tate makes diligent efforts to prevent terrorists from using its territory to
plan and prepare for attacks on other [S]tates, but is incapable of
204. G.A. Res. 40/61, supra note 122.
205. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, supra note 137.
206. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,44
(Feb. 20).
207. Romano, supra note 59, at 1033.
208. Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 830, 839 (Apr. 1928); see also U.N.
CHARTER art. 2(4); Reisman, supra note 41, at 51.
209. Romano, supra note 59, at 1033; Schmitt, supra note 9, at 391.
210. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 88 (July 9) (Moore, J.,
dissenting).




accomplishing this objective, will it fulfill its international obligation. 212 For
that reason, a State lacks culpability under customary international law only
if its power is insufficient to fully respond to or eradicate terrorist groups
within its borders.
G. Criminal Law
No source of international law imputes criminal liability to a State for
sponsorship or support of terrorist activity.2 13  As Professor M. Cherif
Bassiouni has remarked, "The area of state criminal responsibility is an area
of international law that has not so far been adequately developed ....
Furthermore, the international community has yet to impose criminal liability
on a State for sponsoring or supporting terrorism. 25 As a result, attempts to
hold States criminally liable for terrorist acts have not produced effective
results.1 6
Nonetheless, international law does have the potential to impose criminal
liability on States in the future. General principles of international law
provide a source of criminal responsibility for State-supported terrorism.
Pursuant to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, a
law generally recognized by States in their domestic legal systems becomes
international law applicable to all States.21 7 With respect to State sponsorship
and support of terrorism, the world's domestic legal systems recognize
criminal liability for a person who aids or abets in the commission of a crime
through provision of supplies, facilities, or training.218 As Professor Tom
Franck discovered from a survey of the world's legal systems, the
"civilized ' 219 States impose criminal liability for aiding and abetting the
commission of a crime.22° Under general principles of international law, then,
an individual faces criminal liability if he sponsors or supports acts of
terrorism because he has effectively aided and abetted their commission.
Although the criminal law has never been applied to a State, States may
212. Romano, supra note 59, at 1034.
213. Hoye, supra note 62, at 111.
214. Bassiouni, Legal Control, supra note 39, at 97.
215. Id. at 96.
216. Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 13.
217. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060,
3 Bevans 1179, 1187.
218. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 99.
219. Although the notion of "civilized" States lacks a clear definition, the international
community continues to use the term. Most likely, it refers to western States. Mimi E. Adjami,
African Courts, International Law, and Comparative Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human
Rights Jurisprudence, 24 MIcH. J. INT'LL. 103, 130 n.134 (2002).
220. Id.
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also potentially be liable for the sponsorship and support of terrorism pursuant
to general principles of international law. According to international law,
States are no less liable than individuals for breaches of international
obligations.2 ' By aiding and abetting terrorist activity, States assume the
same responsibility as individuals for their actions.22 General Assembly
Resolution 40/61 specifically states that criminal liability results from all acts
of terrorism, regardless of the responsible party's identity. 23 Therefore, the
potential, although undeveloped at this time, does exist to hold States
criminally responsible for supporting, sponsoring, or acquiescing to terrorism.
However, unless a State actively sponsors terrorist acts, terrorism will likely
remain an individual criminal activity, subjecting only the terrorists
themselves to criminal liability.224
H. Jus Cogens Peremptory Norms
Civilian targeting by state-sponsored terrorists also implicates ajus cogens
peremptory norm of international law. 22  Jus cogens principles are
fundamental norms of international law from which no State may derogate
226
and, as such, are the highest rules of international law.227 Traditionally, jus
cogens norms encompass piracy, slavery, genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and torture. 22' The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
indicates that both "the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals"
and "torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment"
fall within jus cogens norms. 2 29 As terrorism often involves extrajudicial
killing, torture, or hostage taking,jus cogens may thereby also prohibit various
terrorist acts.
221. George T. Yates, State Responsibility for Nonwealth Injuries to Aliens in the Postwar
Era, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 213 (Richard
B. Lillich ed., 1983).
222. See Cohan, supra note 1, at 95.
223. G.A. Res. 40/61, supra note 122, art. 1.
224. Scheideman, supra note 52, at 269.
225. Hoye, supra note 62, at 110-11.
226. Vienna Convention, supra note 201, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344; Case Concerning
the Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 916,965 (June 2); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k (1987).
227. Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
228. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes,
59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996) [hereinafter Bassiouni, International Crimes].





InAlejandre v. Republic of Cuba,23° the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida noted that the terrorist act of extrajudicial killing
implicated ajus cogens principle.23' In addition, the court classified terrorist
airplane hijackings as piracy,232 thereby also defining such terrorist activity as
a jus cogens violation. As the Alejandre case illustrates, historically jus
cogens has not incorporated terrorism as a distinct classification. Instead,
courts and scholars have reasoned that the jus cogens peremptory norms of
piracy, torture, or extrajudicial killing encompass terrorism.
However, when drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
parties purposefully chose ambiguous wording, so as to reflect the changing
nature of jus cogens norms.233 Jus cogens principles are dynamic and thus
expand over time to reflect new norms accepted by the international
community as nonderogable.234 Therefore, as terrorism gains attention in the
international community as a threat to peace and a "shock [to] the conscience
of humanity, 235 it will likely gain the designation of a peremptory norm.
Indeed, many scholars now recognize that terrorism has evolved to occupy its
own position as ajus cogens principle of international law.236
However, scholars disagree as to whetherjus cogens norms proscribe State
sponsorship of terrorism.237 Nonetheless, international peremptory norms also
encompass the United Nations prohibition of the use of force.238
Consequently, any use of force by a State through support or sponsorship of
terrorism seemingly violates not only the U.N. Charter, but also jus cogens
principles. Because State sponsorship and support of terrorism contravene the
U.N. Charter, as clarified through subsequent resolutions, such State action
also violates jus cogens fundamental norms of international law.
230. 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
231. Id. at 1252.
232. Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger & Teree E. Foster, More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying
Content-Based Speech Regulations Through Binding International Law, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 59, 100-01 (1995).
233. Parker & Neylon, supra note 200, at 428.
234. See Mayer-Sch6nberger & Foster, supra note 232, at 102.
235. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 228, at 69.
236. Joshua Bardavid, The Failure of the State-Centric Model of international Law and the
International Criminal Court, 15 N.Y. INT'LL. REv. 9,20 (2002); Hoye, supra note 62, at 110-
11; Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All Nations
Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DETROrr C. L. J. INT'L L. 1, 25 (2000); Mayer-
Sch6nberger & Foster, supra note 232, at 100.
237. Hoye, supra note 62, at 111; Intoccia, supra note 74, at 192-93.
238. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNrrED STATES § 102 cmt.
k (1987); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100-01 (June 27).
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L The Law of State Responsibility
In addition to the U.N. Charter and other primary sources of international
law, the Law of State Responsibility provides guidance for, attributing
responsibility to States who act to sponsor or support terrorism. Adopted by
General Assembly resolution in 2002, the Draft Articles on the Law of State
Responsibility239 provide consequences for States responsible for committing
international wrongs." However, the Articles require the international
community to attribute the wrongful act to the State before it can impose
accountability. 24' According to the Draft Articles, a wrongful act is attributed
to a State if the conduct is carried out by the State's organs, 24 2 by figures of
authority acting in their official capacity, 243 by individuals or groups "under
the direction or control of' the State,2 or if the State "adopts [conduct] as its
own."245 Because attribution is limited to control by the State, a State is
thereby responsible under the Draft Articles only for State terrorism and State
sponsorship of terrorism. The Draft Articles prohibit State support of a
terrorist group where it essentially adopts the group's conduct through
propaganda or other political support to claim or benefit from the wrongful
acts.
The Draft Articles also specifically hold a State responsible for aiding or
assisting, directing and controlling, or coercing terrorist activity if that support
is provided to another State that conducts terrorist activity.2 6 Therefore,
although acts carried out by terrorist organizations may fall under the category
of international wrongs, the Articles specifically limit State responsibility to
supplying other States with terrorist support.
Regardless of the limitation imposed by the Draft Articles, general
international law principles of State responsibility provide that States assume
responsibility for all violations of international law.247 Therefore, where
States violate primary international law, such as the U.N. Charter, treaty law,
239. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2002) [hereinafterArticles on State
Responsibility].
240. The Articles provide only secondary rules of State responsibility; they do not address
primary rules of international law, which create the substantive obligations States must follow.
See supra note 36.
241. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 239, art. 2.
242. Id. art. 4.
243. Id. art. 5.
244. Id. art. 8.
245. Id. art. 11.
246. Id. arts. 16-18.




and customary international law, they may be held responsible for sponsorship
and support of terrorism under traditional principles of state responsibility.
IV. Difficulties Raised by the Application of International Law to State-
Sponsored Terrorism
A. States Intentionally Conceal Their Role in Terrorist Activities
Despite the numerous sources of international law that provide a sound
basis for imposing responsibility on States for sponsoring, supporting, or
acquiescing to terrorism, the reality of holding States accountable presents a
more significant problem. Indeed, "[flor years States have supplied funds,
arms, and sanctuary to known terrorist organizations without being treated as
having responsibility for the terrorist actions." '248 This reflects the fact that
States purposely use terrorism to induce political change without
recognition.249 Indeed, the sole purpose of a State's use of terrorist activity is
to evade exposure.25 States intentionally avoid responsibility for terrorist
attacks by supporting terrorism, rather than attacking other States
themselves.25' By providing assistance to groups outside their territory and
using other means to evade accountability,252 States may actually avoid
detection to a greater extent than the terrorist organizations that benefit from
their support.253
In addition to employing tactics to avoid responsibility, States also deny
knowledge of, or involvement in, terrorist activity. A State can merely deny
providing any support and subsequently defend that claim by using circuitous
channels to contribute such assistance. Additionally, States have learned to
avoid accountability by legitimizing the existence of the terrorist groups they
sponsor or support. 4 A State may claim that the assistance it provides goes
to a force involved in "freedom fighting," which often justifies the use of
terrorist tactics to achieve the socially valid goal of self-determination. 55
248. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 100.
249. Scheideman, supra note 52, at 262.
250. Id.
251. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 94-95; cf Reisman, supra note 41, at 55.
252. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 100.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 101; cf Reisman, supra note 41, at 58.
255. See HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 26. For a general discussion of the concept of "freedom
fighters," see Shannon E. French, Murderers, Not Warriors, in TERRORISM ANDINTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 31.
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B. Insufficient Evidence Exists to Support an Imposition of Accountability
Obtaining sufficient evidence to prove State accountability also presents a
serious problem.256 Many efforts to prove the involvement of a State in
terrorist activity lack sufficient evidence because terrorist States typically
deny any involvement.5 7 Where a State merely tacitly approves of terrorist
organizations within its territory, the difficulty in obtaining sufficient evidence
increases. 2 Terrorist groups, which employ decentralized organization and
thus divide assignments among numerous branches of the organization, often
evade detection themselves.259 Because it is already difficult to establish a
link to a specific terrorist group, the transfer of accountability becomes even
more tenuous when applied to the State supporting that group.260
Although circumstantial evidence may exist to link a State to terrorism, it
is often insufficient when accountability must be proven for two layers of
responsible parties. First, sufficient evidence must link the terrorist
organization to the act, and second, evidence must show that the State
sponsors or supports that group.26" ' This difficulty is exacerbated by the
informality of the relationships between a State and terrorist organizations.262
Where support and sponsorship are made through secret channels and without
documentation, it is difficult to obtain sufficient proof that the State assisted
the terrorist cell. Even if evidence does exist, the need to keep the evidence
and the sources of intelligence secret further limit the ability to hold States
accountable.263
In addition, Nicaragua v. United States indicated that holding a State liable
for sponsorship of terrorist activity requires significant evidence. 2" Following
the Nicaragua decision, it is apparent that the International Court of Justice
requires sufficient evidence to show that a State actually exercised control
256. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 98.
257. Hearings, supra note 2, at 52 (statement of Colonel Randall J. Larsen); Abbott, supra
note 18, at 294; Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense (A Call to
Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOus. J. INT'L L. 25, 36 (1987);
Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 14.
258. Baker, supra note 257, at 37.
259. Both Abu Nidal and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are known for such
tactics. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 98.
260. Sharp, supra note 17, at 38.
261. Scheideman, supra note 52, at 264.
262. Id.
263. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 105.




over a terrorist group before it will hold the State accountable for supporting
265terrorists.
However, Abraham Sofaer, legal advisor to the State Department during the
Reagan Administration, claims that a State remains accountable for terrorist
acts even if insufficient evidence exists to tie the State to a specific act of
terrorism.2 66 Based on Sofaer's reasoning, if a State has engaged in "general
and continuing support" of a terrorist organization, evidence of that general
support should be sufficient to establish responsibility. 67 Some scholars
disagree, instead finding that terrorist activity can be imputed to a State only
if evidence can "directly link[]" that State's assistance to the harm caused to
the victim State.2 68 As a result, although international law provides the basis
for holding States accountable, the practical application of the law may often
allow States to avoid repercussions.
V. Means to Hold States Responsible for Sponsoring and Supporting
Terrorism
While it is beyond the scope of this comment to examine the various
remedies available to impose accountability on States, it is nonetheless
important to recognize the potential options available to victims - both
individuals and States. Consequently, this section provides an overview of the
various methods of holding States accountable, from diplomatic means to
judicial suits to the use of force.
A. Diplomatic Means
Both individual States and the United Nations have repeatedly used
diplomatic means to impose liability on terrorist-supporting States.269
Diplomatic means involve both diplomatic and economic sanctions. Among
other options, States have the ability to sever diplomatic ties, withdraw
recognition of the sponsoring government, impose trade controls, and freeze
foreign assets in response to State sponsorship or support of terrorism.70 The
United States has often employed diplomatic sanctions against terrorist States,
tying the strength of the sanctions to the level of terrorist involvement.
27
265. Id.
266. Beck & Arend, supra note 44, at 212.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 219.
269. See infra Part V.D.
270. Sharp, supra note 17, at 43.
271. Abbott, supra note 18, at 309.
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Nonetheless, it remains unclear as to whether diplomatic sanctions actually
reduce State involvement with terrorist groups. 2 Those States that resort to
using terrorism as an element of foreign policy may have little concern for
diplomatic relations with other members of the world community. With
respect to economic sanctions, States usually employ economic restrictions
and other trade controls in an attempt to reduce the financial ability of
sponsoring States to assist terrorism. 273 Unfortunately, it is far from clear that
the imposition of such economic sanctions serve to deter or hinder State
sponsorship or support of terrorism.2 74 Furthermore, where other States have
already severed ties with terrorist States, there remain no further sanctions to
275impose.
B. Judicial Suits
Because the choice of forum has a significant effect on the judgment of a
suit, it is important to recognize that judicial remedies may involve either
international or domestic lawsuits.
1. International Courts
Based on the positive law concept mandating that States are bound only by
those laws to which they agree, international judicial remedies require the
consent of the involved States to accept the judgment of the court or other
judicial body.2 76 To hold a State accountable through international civil
remedies for sponsoring terrorist activity, the State must either waive its
sovereign immunity for such claims or agree to the jurisdiction of
international courts.277 However, it is unlikely that a State sponsor or
supporter of terrorism will do either.278 Therefore, international suits rarely
provide an effective remedy for victim States.
Although the I.C.J. has heard several cases involving State responsibility
for terrorism, limits of I.C.J. jurisdiction and application have negatively
affected the imposition of State liability. According to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, cases may only involve States, and both States
involved in a dispute must consent to the Court's jurisdiction.279 Furthermore,
272. See id. at 305.
273. Id.
274. See generally O'SuLLVAN, supra note 8, at 284-320.
275. See Abbott, supra note 18, at 3 10-11.
276. See Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 13.
277. Hoye, supra note 62, at 113.
278. Id.
279. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 217, art. 36, 59 Stat. at




I.C.J. judgments have binding authority only for the parties to the dispute and
only in relation to the case before the court."' Finally, while the U.N.
Security Council has the authority to make recommendations or determine
measures to enforce I.C.J. judgments,2 ' the U.N. has never enforced a
judgment of the court.282 As a result, the I.C.J. likely provides an inadequate
forum for holding State sponsors and supporters of terrorism accountable.
2. Domestic Courts
Because it is also highly unlikely that a suit brought in the domestic courts
of the terrorist State will provide any effective remedy,28 3 domestic civil
remedies are normally limited to suits in the victim State. Therefore, to
understand potential remedies, domestic civil suits must be examined through
the courts of the victim States.
In the United States, courts have jurisdiction to hear terrorism sponsorship
cases only under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).2 84 Congress
created an exception to the FSIA in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),285 which allows private civil suits in U.S. courts
against designated State sponsors of terrorism.28 6 Under the AEDPA, if an
agent of a State, acting within the scope of his duties, causes personal injury
or death by taking hostages, sabotaging aircraft, torturing or murdering
individuals, or providing "material support or resources" for one of these
activities, private individuals have a valid claim for damages. 287 However, the
280. Id. art. 59, 59 Stat. at 1062, 3 Bevans at 1190.
281. U.N. CHARTER art. 94(2).
282. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (Richard A.
Epstein et al. eds., 3d ed. 1999).
283. Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 14.
284. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000);
Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 15.
285. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 221, 28 U.S.C.A. §
1605(a)(7) (West Supp. 2003).
286. Hoye, supra note 62, at 109, 117-18; see Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 163 F.3d 748 (2d Cit. 1998); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d
46 (D.D.C. 2003); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000). But
see Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004). On January 16,
2004, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that AEDPA does not create a
private cause of action against foreign State sponsors of terrorism. Id. at 1033. While the
Flatow Amendment does provide a private cause of action for terrorist acts, the Court held that
suits under the Amendment are limited to "officials, employees, and agents of a state." Id. As
of the time this Comment went to press, it was unclear whether the D.C. Circuit's decision
would be appealed.
287. John F. Murphy, Foreign Claims, 32 INT'L LAW. 453, 455-56 (1998) [hereinafter
Murphy, Foreign Claims].
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defendant State must have been identified as a terrorism sponsor by either the
Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.288
Currently, only Cuba, Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Sudan and North Korea hold
this designation.289 An exception to this requirement is made only if the State
is labeled a terrorist sponsor as a result of the act giving rise to the suit.29°
Nonetheless, the AEDPA exception has allowed numerous plaintiffs to obtain
substantial judgments against terrorist States.291 Unfortunately, even if a
plaintiff manages to successfully obtain judgment against a State for
supporting terrorism, that party will face an exceedingly difficult challenge in
collecting on that judgment.292 Few plaintiffs have collected on their
judgements awarded under the AEDPA.293
C. Self-Defense Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter allows States to defend themselves against
an armed attack. However, significant debate exists as to what constitutes an
armed attack. 294 Indeed, a member State cannot invoke self-defense if the
aggression mounted against it does not rise to the level of an armed attack.295
In applying this standard to State support of terrorism, the International Court
of Justice, in Nicaragua v. United States, found that the provision of arms and
training to terrorists did not meet the standard for an armed attack and thus
could not justify self-defense.296 A State's assistance to terrorists must
therefore exceed this level of participation to satisfy the requirements for
justified self-defense under Article 51 .297 According to the I.C.J., State
support of terrorism is normally insufficient to invoke the right to self-defense.
However, some authorities claim that a victim State has the right to respond
to all terrorist acts with self-defense regardless of the level of a State's
involvement in terrorism.298 Nonetheless, customary international law requires
288. Id. at 456.
289. PArrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2002, supra note 14, at 150.
290. Murphy, Foreign Claims, supra note 287, at 456.
291. See, e.g., Eisenfeld, 172F. Supp. 2dat 10-11; Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999
F. Supp. 1, 32-34 (D.D.C. 1998); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253-54
(S.D. Fla. 1997).
292. Dellapenna, supra note 41, at 16-17.
293. Allison Taylor, Note, Another Front in the War on Terrorism? Problems with Recent
Changes to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 45 ARiz. L. REV. 533, 540-42 (2003).
294. Schmitt, supra note 9, at 387; Sofaer, supra note 9, at 93.
295. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 94.
296. Id. at 94-95.
297. Romano, supra note 59, at 1037; see also Sharp, supra note 17, at 40.




that self-defense meet standards of both necessity and proportionality. 99
Where a State continually sponsors terrorist activity, sufficient necessity may
exist for a victim State to respond with the use of force.3" However, self-
defense does not provide an appropriate means of response when a State
sponsors a single isolated terrorist act.
30'
D. Historical Attempts to Hold States Accountable for Terrorist Activity
Despite the numerous sources of international law prohibiting States from
sponsoring, supporting, or acquiescing to terrorism, the international
community has had mixed reactions to actual attempts to hold such States
accountable. Accordingly, to properly understand the significance of the
primary sources of international law prohibiting sponsorship, support, and
acquiescence, it is necessary to examine international reaction to past attempts
to hold States accountable.
Economic and diplomatic sanctions have generally received widespread
support as a response to State sponsors of terrorism. Indeed, the United
Nations has itself adopted sanctions as a weapon against States responsible for
supporting and sponsoring terrorism. In 1992, the U.N. Security Council
passed Resolution 748302 in response to the Libyan government's refusal to
hand over the accused Lockerbie bombers.30 3 Resolution 748 marked the first
time the Security Council responded to State support of terrorism by imposing
sanctions on a government for shielding terrorists." Subsequently, the
Security Council also sanctioned the Sudan for its involvement in harboring
terrorists.30 5 More recently, the Security Council, recognizing the Taliban's
support of Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda organization, applied diplomatic
299. Sharp, supra note 17, at 42.
300. Id.
301. Id. The United States partly responded to the September 11 terrorist attacks by
invading Afghanistan. However, the justification used for the attack relied on al Qaeda's
prominent past involvement in several prominent terrorist attacks. Specifically, al Qaeda had
bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, the U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, and the U.S.S.
Cole in 2000. Schmitt, supra note 9, at 395-96.
302. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).
303. Murphy, Foreign Claims, supra note 287, at 461. The U.N. sanctions placed on Libya
for the Lockerbie bombing were finally lifted in September 2003 after Libya accepted
responsibility for the acts, agreed to refrain from further terrorism, and promised to compensate
the Lockerbie victims' families. Peter Slevin, U.N. Vote Removes Sanctions on Libya, WASH.
POST, Sept. 13, 2003, at A14; see also Bassiouni, Legal Control, supra note 39, at 96.
304. Paul C. Szasz, Alternate Strategies for the United Nations' Fight Against Terrorism,
3 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 343, 345 (1993).
305. S.C. Res. 1054, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3660th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1054 (1996).
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and economic sanctions against Afghanistan's Taliban regime in 1998 and
2000. 3o
Like the United Nations, the United States has also used economic and
diplomatic sanctions against State supporters and sponsors of terrorism.
President Ronald Reagan ended all U.S. economic relations with Libya in
response to the 1985 terrorist bombings of two airline offices.0 7 Although
Kaddafi denied that Libya played any role in the attacks, the United States
argued that Libya supported the Abu Nidal organization responsible for the
bombings.3"' According to President Reagan, Abu Nidal had received direct
support from Libya.3" In addition, the U.S. position in response to the
Lockerbie bombing mirrored that of the United Nations; the United States
again imposed economic sanctions on Libya as a result of its role in the
bombing.310
In contrast to the widely accepted imposition of economic and diplomatic
sanctions, historically the international community has largely criticized the
use of force as a response to State sponsors and supporters of terrorism. In
1985, Israel chose to attack the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
headquarters located in Tunisia.31' The Security Council approved Resolution
573312 by a fourteen to zero vote condemning Israel's use of force.3 13 In 1986,
President Reagan authorized an aerial attack on Libyan military targets after
the bombing of a West German dance club.3" 4 Kaddafi again denied any
Libyan involvement in the bombing; however, President Reagan claimed that
the United States had "incontrovertible evidence" of Libya's role.3 5 The U.S.
response was widely decried in the international community. 316 In fact, the
U.N. General Assembly "condemned" the attack and called it a violation of
the U.N. Charter. 37 The European Economic Community (EEC) expressed
its disapproval by choosing an alternative course of action. Rather than
resorting to the use of force, the EEC limited staff at Libyan embassies and
306. Beard, supra note 96, at 578, 583.
307. Intoccia, supra note 74, at 182-83; Reisman, supra note 41, at 30.
308. Intoccia, supra note 74, at 182; Reisman, supra note 41, at 30.
309. Terry, supra note 40, at 181.
310. Reisman, supra note 41, at 35
311. Id. at 38.
312. S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (1985).
313. Reisman, supra note 41, at 38.
314. Intoccia, supra note 74, at 185.
315. Id.
316. Reisman, supra note 41, at 33 (noting that only Great Britain, Israel, South Africa, and
Canada accepted the U.S. response); Schmitt, supra note 9, at 380-8 1.





called for other diplomatic sanctions to hold Libya accountable for the
bombing.318
Nonetheless, the international community appears gradually to be accepting
the use of force as an appropriate response to State sponsors and supporters
of terrorism. For example, the United States utilized force against both the
Sudan and Afghanistan after the 1998 bombings of two American embassies
in Africa.319 Imposition of State accountability and the subsequent
justification for firing cruise missiles at Sudanese and Afghani terrorist sites
arose from the U.S. claim that those countries "cooperated" with the al Qaeda
organization.32° In addition, the United States argued that the Sudan and
Afghanistan had failed to expel terrorists from their borders.32" ' Rather than
focusing solely the Sudanese and Afghani role in the embassy bombings, the
United States broadened the scope of its reasoning to include past and
potential attacks as well.322 Although General Henry Shelton, then-Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed that U.S. intelligence showed "extensive
ties" between the al Qaeda network and the Sudanese government, that
intelligence failed to indicate whether the Sudanese government knew that the
targeted chemical plant in its territory produced terrorist weaponry.323
Subsequently, the United States admitted that it had evidence only of "indirect
ties" of terrorist activity to the chemical plant.324 Nonetheless, the United
States received the support of several States in the international community
for its chosen response. Unlike the unanimous opposition to the bombing of
Libya in 1986, the international community divided in their reactions.325
Finally, in reaction to the horrific events of September 11, the United States
joined with other States to invade Afghanistan in the first stage of the War on
Terrorism.326 However, the Taliban had provided al Qaeda with little more
than safe harbor.327 Strangely, the international community nonetheless
widely supported the U.S. decision.328 It seems therefore that the international
community may be moving toward a more expansive view of the acceptable
318. Intoccia, supra note 74, at 188.
319. Beard, supra note 96, at 562.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Reisman, supra note 41, at 48.
323. Scheideman, supra note 52, at 257.
324. Id. at 258-59.
325. Schmitt, supra note 9, at 381 ("Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, and Yemen
condemned the strikes, while Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, and the United
Kingdom supported them."); see Reisman, supra note 41, at 19.
326. See Brown, supra note 52, at 2.
327. Schmitt, supra note 9, at 399.
328. Id.
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responses to terrorist support.329 In addition, the international community
appears to accept that States merely acquiescing to terrorist cells nonetheless
assume accountability.
While historically few States have had to answer for supporting terrorism,
an increase in terrorist activity has led to growing international recognition
that States are responsible for terrorism carried out with their support. The
current Bush Administration has echoed these views. President Bush
promised to hold States that support terrorists as accountable as the terrorist
actors themselves when he stated, "[W]e will deal with those who harbor
[terrorists] and feed them and house them."'33
VI. Conclusion
With the increase in the destructiveness of terrorism, imposing
responsibility on States for acts of terrorism has become a significant issue.
Because the efficacy of terrorist organizations often depends on the support
provided by States, the peace and security of the international community
depends on eliminating State support and sponsorship of terrorism. States
have the resources, from money to weapons to power, to help a terrorist group
obtain the political change it desires through the use of fear. As a result, it is
imperative to ensure that sponsorship and support of terrorism imputes
accountability to the responsible State. Without such accountability, States
will have unchecked capacity to provide significant resources to terrorist
organizations or allow their unhindered use of the State's territory to carry out
attacks.
International law provides a sufficient basis to impose responsibility on
States through the U.N. Charter and subsequent resolutions providing
guidance to the Charter. States also assume accountability for sponsoring and
supporting terrorist activity from other sources of international law, including
human rights instruments, customary international law, general principles of
international law, and jus cogens peremptory norms. Decisions of the I.C.J.
have confirmed the imposition of State liability, although to varying
degrees - depending on the level of State terrorist support.
329. Most recently, in October 2003, Israel bombed a suspected terrorist training camp in
Syria in response to suicide bombings. Israel claimed that terrorists based in that State
perpetrated the attacks. John Ward Anderson, Israeli Airstrike Hits Site in Syria, WASH. POST,
Oct. 6, 2003, at Al. Although the Arab States widely condemned the Israeli attacks, many of
the remaining States in the international community merely urged Israel not to heighten tensions
in the region. Megan K. Stack, Israel Widens Fight, Bombs Camp in Syria, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
6, 2003, at Al.




Although public policy demonstrates the need to hold States accountable
for supporting or sponsoring terrorism, the evidence necessary to prove
sponsorship or support is often insufficient. States use terrorism to prevent
accountability, and thus expend a great deal of energy avoiding liability.
Consequently, the practical application of international law poses a serious
concern for consideration. However, where States like Iran have a proven
history of supporting and sponsoring terrorism, international law provides the
basis for imposing accountability.
By imposing State accountability for providing support to terrorist groups,
the international community encourages States to eliminate their involvement
in terrorism. In addition, holding States responsible for supporting and
sponsoring terrorism serves to deter State assistance, which prevents the
massive influx of resources to terrorist organizations and limits their ability
to effectively carry out operations. The International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism33' notes that "the number and
seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing that
terrorists may obtain."332 This principle is equally applicable to other forms
of support and sponsorship provided by States to terrorist groups.333 To make
any impact on the War on Terror, it is therefore necessary to target the true
terrorists. The international community must invoke international law to hold
Big Brother accountable.
Sarah E. Smith
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